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Abstract
Talking it out with others vs. deliberation within and the law of group polarization: Some implications of
the argumentative theory of reasoning for deliberative democracy. This paper argues that a new
psychological theory—the argumentative theory of reasoning—provides theoretical support for the
discursive, dialogical ideal of democratic deliberation. It converges, in particular, with deliberative
democrats’ predictions about the positive epistemic properties of talking things out with others. The
paper further considers two influential objections to democratic deliberation: first, that “deliberation
within” rather than deliberation with others carries most of the burden in terms of changing people’s
minds; and second, that the so-called “law of group polarization” casts serious doubts on the value of
democratic deliberation and, more generally, the ideal of deliberative democracy. Keywords: deliberative
democracy; argumentative theory of reasoning; epistemic democracy; law of group polarization.
Resolução de diferenças com os outros através do diálogo vs. deliberação interna e a lei de polarização
do grupo: Algumas implicações da teoria argumentativa do pensamento na democracia deliberativa
deliberativa. Este
artigo defende que uma nova teoria psicológica – a teoria argumentativa do pensamento – fornece uma
base teórica ao ideal discursivo e dialógico da deliberação democrática. Converge, em particular, com as
previsões dos democratas deliberativos acerca das propriedades epistémicas positivas da resolução de
diferenças através do diálogo. O presente artigo considera ainda duas objeções importantes à
deliberação democrática: em primeiro lugar, que a “deliberação interna”, mais do que a deliberação com
outros, tem uma maior responsabilidade em termos da alteração das ideias dos indivíduos; e, em
segundo lugar, que a chamada «lei de polarização do grupo» coloca sérias dúvidas acerca do valor da
deliberação democrática e, de uma forma mais geral, acerca do ideal da democracia deliberativa.
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Talking it out with others vs. deliberation
within and the law of group polarization:
Some implications of the argumentative theory
of reasoning for deliberative democracy

The ideal of democratic deliberation at the heart of theories of deliberative
democracies has been criticized from many fronts since its first formulation in
the late 1980s. As a normative ideal, it is often attacked for being too demanding and too utopian to be worth pursuing. At one extreme, critics argue that
democratic deliberation, in practice, does not do as much to change people’s
minds as the monological reflection of “deliberation within” (Goodin and
Niemeyer, 2003; Goodin, 2000, 2003 and 2008); at the other extreme, others argue that it changes minds, but for the worse due to “the law of group
polarization,” whereby like-minded groups simply tend toward more extreme
versions of their own starting points (Sunstein, 2002). Given the extent of this
problem, we have good reasons for preferring simple judgment aggregation to
deliberation (Sunstein, 2002; S urowiecki, 2004).
Empirical results in political science and social psychology seem to
buttress this skeptical view. Sometimes group deliberation homogenizes attitudes, sometimes it polarizes them; sometimes group decisions are better
than individual decisions, sometimes not (see e. g. Kerr, MacCoun and
Kramer, 1996). As Dennis Thompson (2008, p. 499) remarks, when it comes
to evaluating what democratic deliberation does and whether it does anything good, “the general conclusion of surveys of the empirical research so
far is that taken together the findings are mixed or inconclusive.” Even the
results observed in James Fishkin’s (2009) deliberative polls—conducted
with success across the globe, including in societies divided along religious
or linguistic lines—do not entirely settle the question. Deliberative polls are
designed in such a way that they give us only the roughest of indications
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that post-deliberative views are “better” than pre-deliberative views, in the
sense that the usual suspects for poor epistemic outcomes (group polarization, lack of information, lack of diversity, lack of single peakedness, etc.)
have not afflicted the deliberations.1
Few democratic theorists, it seems fair to assume, would be willing
to claim that the normative ideal of democratic deliberation can remain
immune to empirical challenges. Most of them are or ought to be bothered
by the remaining uncertainty regarding the epistemic properties of democratic deliberation, particularly on salient issues.2 Part of the problem with
the current literature lies in the fact that “deliberation” is not always properly
construed in the experiments aimed at measuring its effects; moreover, the
standards by which the transformative and epistemic properties of deliberation are measured (ranging from various factual and logical standards to
more vague notions of “betterness”) are often inconsistent across experiments
or even irrelevant.3 Perhaps conducting more specifically designed experiments in the future might yield more definitive results, one way or the other.
Thus, one way to resolve the current ambiguity of empirical results might
be to keep running experiments and, for example, more explicitly epistemic
studies of deliberative polls.
Another approach, which is not exclusive of the empirical route, consists
of going back to the theory of deliberative democracy to confront the model of
democratic deliberation at its normative core, using theoretical insights from
other disciplines. Deliberative democracy has undeniably benefited from
engagement with the results of empirical studies of deliberation in political

For a recent effort at identifying more precisely what does the transformative work in deliberative polls, see Farrar et al. (2010). The results presented in this article go some way toward
demonstrating that deliberation has epistemic properties but they are far from conclusive.
Indeed, what the results show is that something happens during the formal, face-to-face deliberation in contrast with the informal deliberation phase that precedes it. The study, however, does
not really open the black box of deliberation per se. Furthermore, it remains to be shown that
more informed opinions contribute to better judgments overall, as measured against a procedure-independent standard of correctness that is not purely factual. While it is indeed likely that
more informed opinions correlate with better political judgments, this is not necessary. In order
to verify this assumption, the experiments would have to be framed in explicitly epistemic terms
rather than in terms of measuring a variation in pre-deliberative and post-deliberative opinions.
2
As to the deliberative democrats who care about deliberation for strictly non-epistemic
reasons, they should at least care that deliberation not wreak epistemic havoc.
3
In Farrar et al. (2010; see above), the experiment does not prove that people actually used
arguments—as we insist that deliberation properly construed requires—simply that they changed their views on some issues.
1
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science and psychology.4 Similarly, deliberative democracy can be enriched
by considering other disciplines’ theoretical approaches to deliberation. Such
a confrontation could help isolate different aspects of deliberation, helping us
to better understand what the epistemic benefits (if any) of deliberation are,
and where they lie.
Arguably, one discipline that has not been properly tapped is psychology—
particularly evolutionary psychology. Deliberative democrats that have turned
to social psychology have for the most past simply borrowed the conclusions
of laboratory or natural experiments, without questioning the theoretical
framework behind the experiments themselves. One assumption behind these
experiments, however, can no longer be taken for granted. According to what
Mercier and Sperber (2011a and 2011b) have dubbed the “classical theory of
reasoning”, the main function of reasoning is to help individuals improve their
beliefs by reflecting upon them. This theory, however, fails to make sense of
much of the available empirical evidence. A more promising alternative now
exists: the “argumentative theory of reasoning” (Mercier and Sperber, 2011a
and 2011b; Mercier and Landemore, 2012; Sperber, 2001; see also Billig, 1996;
Gibbard, 1990). The argumentative theory of reasoning posits a new evolutionary function for reasoning: argumentation with others, rather than private
ratiocination.5 Our paper seeks to derive some of the implications of this new
psychological theory for the theory of deliberative democracy.
The first section of the paper presents the argumentative theory of reasoning and clarifies the nature of the implications it may have for democratic theory and, specifically, for the debate between advocates and critics of
the deliberative ideal. The two subsequent sections aim to refute two major
objections to the application of the argumentative theory of reasoning to the
case of democratic deliberation’s epistemic properties, and show that these
objections are, ultimately, weak. The two objections considered are, first,
Goodin and Niemeyer’s argument against so-called “external deliberation”
and in favor of “deliberation within,” and, second, Cass Sunstein’s influential critique of deliberation based on the alleged existence of a “law of group
polarization.”

See reviews of this literature in, e. g., Mendelberg (2002); Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs
(2004); and Ryfe (2005). This empirical literature has tested some of the implicit predictions
contained in the normative model of deliberative democracy and brought to the attention of
theorists the real-life constraints weighing on their ideal.
5
See also Mercier and Landemore (2012), in which the authors show how this new theory
can make sense of contradictory data on the successes and failures of deliberation.
4
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T H E A RG UM E N TAT I V E T H E ORY
OF R E AS ON I N G A N D DE L I B E R AT I V E DE M O C R AC Y

The argumentative theory of reasoning defines reasoning as a specific cognitive mechanism that aims at finding and evaluating reasons, so that individuals
can convince other people and evaluate their arguments.
This definition may seem quite intuitive and obvious, but it is, in fact, a
marked break from another theory of reasoning that continues to dominate contemporary psychology, in particular the psychology of reasoning
and decision-making. According to this more “classical” view of reasoning,
reasoning allows us to improve our epistemic status by correcting our own
beliefs and intuitions, and building on these foundations to reach knowledge
and improve the correctness of our judgments and decisions (Evans and Over,
1996; K
 ahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 2004). Although dominant in psychology,
this theory runs into problems at the empirical level, where it cannot account
for a wealth of data about the imperfections of individual reasoning.
Indeed, it is well established in psychology that when reasoning is used
internally to generate knowledge and make better decisions, its performance
is often disappointing. People have trouble understanding simple arguments
in abstract, de-contextualized form (Evans, 2002; Wason, 1966; Wason and
Brooks, 1979). Reasoning often fails to override intuitions that are blatantly
wrong (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994; Frederick, 2005). In some cases, more
reasoning can even lead to worse outcomes: it can make us too sure of ourselves (Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980), allow us to maintain discredited beliefs (Guenther and Alicke, 2008; Ross, Lepper and Hubbard, 1975),
and drive us toward poor decisions (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Shafir, Simonson,
Tversky, 1993; Wilson and Schooler, 1991). On the classical approach to reasoning, these empirical findings are profoundly disturbing because it seems
that human reasoning is deeply flawed and in need of correction. A major
problem for the classical theory, in particular, is the existence of the “confirmation bias,” a well-established tendency to seek arguments that bolster the side
that the reasoner already favors (Nickerson, 1998).
As a tool for individual use, reasoning thus does not appear to be particularly compelling. The argumentative theory of reasoning proposes to abandon
the classical theory and replace it with an hypothesis generated with a different
method, that of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists rely on the
heuristic value of evolutionary theory (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 2002) to
make and test predictions regarding behavior and psychological mechanisms,
some of which may seem otherwise puzzling, such as lapses in memory (Klein
et al., 2002). Evolutionary psychologists thus seek functional explanations—
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that is, explanations that account for features of a trait by appealing to its function, i. e., the production of certain beneficial consequences (see also Elster,
2007; Hardin, 1980). Such functional explanations are particularly appealing
when a psychological mechanism introduces some apparent systematic distortion rather than random error (which could plausibly be explained by limited
capacity). Reasoning certainly exhibits such systematic biases, most strikingly
in the aforementioned case of the confirmation bias.
Evolutionary theory suggests that if individual reasoning is rather bad at
figuring out the truth when used internally, then this cannot be its main function. Based on ideas introduced by Dan Sperber (2000 and 2001), the argumentative theory of reasoning has thus been developed to account for reasoning’s
features, including its biases, in a way that makes evolutionary sense of them.
Instead of assuming, as the classical theory does, that the function of reasoning
is to allow lone reasoners to improve their epistemic status through ratiocination, proponents of the new theory hypothesize that the function of reasoning
is to find and evaluate reasons, so that individuals can convince other people
and evaluate their arguments in dialogic contexts (Mercier and Sperber, 2011a
and 2011b; Mercier and Landemore, 2012; Sperber, 2001; see also Billig, 1996;
Gibbard, 1990).
The argumentative theory of reasoning thus breaks with the classical view
first in the way it reaches its main hypothesis and, second, in the content of this
hypothesis. By so doing, the argumentative approach is able to interpret what
seemed like vices as virtues. If the goal of reasoning is to convince others, then
the confirmation bias is actually useful, since it leads to the identification of
arguments that can be used to achieve this goal. Likewise, we can make sense
of the fact that people are generally good at falsifying statements that oppose
their own views.
The relationship of the argumentative function to truth-finding is complex and worth emphasizing, especially in contrast to the more straightforward classical theory according to which one of the functions of reasoning
in individuals is to figure out the truth about the world. In the argumentative
theory of reasoning we need to distinguish between the complementary tasks
of the argumentative function of reasoning, namely that of producing arguments for one’s beliefs and that of assessing the arguments advanced by others.
As far as the production of arguments is concerned, reasoning has (and should
have) little concern for the pursuit of objective truth since its main function is
to derive support for beliefs already accepted as true. When individuals wish
to convince others of a given proposition, they generally do not check if the
proposition is true since they already believe it. All they are interested in is
finding good arguments to support the proposition and convince the listener.
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By contrast, as listeners and receivers of arguments, individuals want to be able
to evaluate arguments—that is, assess their epistemic soundness—in order to
decide whether they should accept their conclusions or not. As far as this evaluative task of reasoning is concerned, it is indirectly concerned with the truth
since individuals want to be able to change their mind when it is epistemically
warranted.
One implication of the argumentative theory of reasoning is that the normal conditions for reasoning are social and, more specifically, deliberative.
Here it should be noted that the term “normal” has no normative/moral connotations, but simply refers to a set of facts about the conditions in which we
claim that reasoning evolved (as in Millikan, 1984). The normal conditions for
the use of reasoning are, according to the argumentative theory of reasoning,
those of deliberation with at least another person and the abnormal ones those
of the solitary mind or non-deliberating groups. This emphasis of the theory
on the social, intersubjective dimension of reasoning makes it particularly
congenial with the core elements of deliberative democracy.
Deliberative democracy is a general umbrella in democratic theory for
various theories that trace the legitimacy of political authority and political
laws and decisions to deliberation among free and equal citizens (e. g., Cohen,
1989, p. 22). Deliberative democrats emphasize democracy as government by
discussion and, specifically, rational deliberation, by which is meant a process
of reason-giving among citizens about matters of the common good. While the
term “deliberative democracy” itself was coined by Joseph Bessette (1980 and
1994), the theory has been elaborated by a number of authors (e. g., Benhabib,
1996; Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1986; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996
and 2002; Habermas, 1991 and 1996 and Rawls, 1971 and 19936). The roots of
the theory can be traced as far back as Aristotle, through Kant and J. S. Mill,
Rawls is arguably a slightly ambiguous deliberative democrat to the extent that the model
of the original position in A Theory of Justice (1971) involves individuals placed behind a veil
of ignorance that turns them into rational clones. As a commentator remarked, “[t]his is deliberation of a sort but only in terms of the weighing of arguments in the mind, not testing them
in real political interaction… [It] downplays the social or interactive aspect of deliberation”
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 15). By contrast, Habermas and others put forward the ideal of a more explicitly dialogical and intersubjective exchange in which the participants are supposed to maintain
their concrete differences even as they seek a rational consensus (Habermas, 1995, p. 113). In his
later work, Rawls substituted his own arguably overly monological ideal of deliberation among
rational individuals placed under a veil of ignorance and seeking unanimous agreement with
the more realistic and dialogical ideal of deliberation among “reasonable” individuals seeking
an “overlapping consensus.” In its latest formulations, Rawls’ deliberative ideal arguably came to
converge toward that of Habermas. See Rawls (1995); see also the analysis by McGann (2006,
pp. 161-166).
6
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although the most interesting heritage for our purpose is probably classical
American pragmatism.
Pragmatists, more so even than contemporary deliberative democrats,
have perceptively emphasized the psychology of the individual mind as essentially dialogical and intersubjective, emerging and constructed in large part
in discursive interactions with others. John Dewey thus thought that “social
intelligence” would emerge from direct deliberation among the members
of the public, in their concomitant use of the embodied knowledge of past
generations, rather than be produced by lone minds, whether of geniuses
or political elites (Dewey, 1954 [1927], p. 218). George Herbert Mead specifically contended that “we must regard mind … as arising and developing
within the social process, within the empirical matrix of social interactions”
(Mead, 1934, p. 133). The deliberative pragmatic tradition can thus be said
to anticipate in crucial ways the core insight of the argumentative theory of
reasoning that the normal context of reasoning is deliberative and fundamentally social.7
The boundaries of what counts as deliberation have been the object of
some contestation among contemporary deliberative democrats—arguably
pitting “Type i” deliberation theorists, who stick to a narrow concept of
deliberation as an exchange of arguments in search of a rational consensus,
against “Type ii” deliberation theorists, who pursue a more empirical agenda
and favor a more flexible and inclusive definition (Bächtiger et al., 2010).
The disagreement between the two groups should not, however, overshadow
what they have in common. Both “Types” favor the role of reasoning and
argumentation in deliberation. Even “Type ii” theorists, who argue for more
inclusive definitions of deliberation that make room for non-rational discourse like story-telling or emotional language (e. g. Mouffe, 1998; S anders,
1997; Young, 2000), in the end reserve a certain normative priority for argumentation over other forms of communication (see Dryzek, 2000, p. 48). The
core definition of deliberation thus remains stable across both Type i and
Type ii deliberation theorists, as “an exchange of arguments for or against
something” (as per Aristotle, 1991, i. 2). In deliberative exchanges, it is
assumed that one of the main goals is to convince others through rationally
persuasive arguments.
Note, however, that whereas classical pragmatists liked to talk about the “mind” as “social,”
the argumentative theory of reasoning more modestly but also more accurately focuses on one
specific mechanism of the mind, namely reasoning. The argumentative theory of reasoning thus
integrates conceptual findings (such as evolutionary theory and the modularity of mind) as well
as empirical data that were simply not available to these early predecessors.
7
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In keeping with this focus on reasoning arguably shared by deliberative
democrats from the classical pragmatists to their contemporary heirs, the new
psychological theory of reasoning proposed here offers the following definition of deliberation: an activity is deliberative to the extent that reasoning is
used to gather and evaluate arguments for and against a given proposition (see
also Mercier and Landemore, 2012). This definition makes reasoning a centerpiece of deliberation. First, the cognitive activity of reasoning—the usage of
“central” as opposed to “peripheral” routes—is crucial. Thus, the content of the
utterances being exchanged is not all that matters; the way they are generated
is important as well (two actors reciting from memory the scripted text of a
deliberation would not be deliberating per se). Second, the definition stresses
the necessity of an exchange, or more precisely, a feedback loop between reasoning from at least two points of view. Assuming that two people each hold
one point of view, the following chain of events is required for genuine deliberation to take place: person a uses reasoning to make an argument from point
of view a; person b uses reasoning to examine a’s argument from point of view
b, which is at least partially opposed to point of view a; person b then uses
reasoning to create an argument that partially or fully opposes the previous
argument from the point of view b; a uses reasoning to examine b’s argument
from point of view a. Notice that the definition of deliberation presented here
allows for the possibility of “internal” as well as “external” deliberation, since
it is possible—although often difficult—for even a lone reasoner to find arguments for an opposite point of view than hers.8 The definition of deliberation embraced by the argumentative theory of reasoning thus draws a sharp
distinction between proper deliberation, which centrally involves the mental
activity specified above (reasoning), and conversation or discussion, which
may not involve this specific mental activity at all.9
In its relation to deliberative democracy, the general implications of the
argumentative theory of reasoning are the following:
If a internally engages in such an exchange of arguments between the two points of view
a and b, then this person is truly deliberating, in her head, with her internal representation of
b’s point of view. Notice, importantly, that if a finds arguments supporting her own point of
view only, then she will still be reasoning, but deliberation will not have taken place. Similarly, a
group of people who all think like a and find arguments supporting the point of view a are not
properly deliberating, even if these arguments are different from theirs, as long as they support
the same position.
9
Manin (2005) has himself called “debate” the type of argumentative deliberation that we
embrace, by contrast with discussion. We do not use that term but simply narrow down our concept of deliberation to exclude mere discussion from it. Notice also that we are not saying that in
the phenomenon of group polarization, people do not reason, simply that they do not deliberate.
8
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1. The theory predicts that even genuinely truth-oriented individuals—
that is participants in the deliberation animated by a sincere desire to
figure out the truth (for example, about what the public good requires
or the implications of a given policy) in contrast to partisans, ideologues, or strategic rhetoricians—will have a hard time fighting their
hard-wired confirmation bias. What the argumentative theory of reasoning implies, therefore, in a non-normative and purely prudential
way, is that if deliberative democrats care about the epistemic properties of democratic deliberation, they should ensure that deliberation
is conducted in such a way as to ensure that individual confirmation
biases do not produce epistemic damages.
2. Reasoning is more likely to yield epistemic benefits for both the individual and the group—that is, to be conducive to true or truer individual
and collective beliefs—when it takes place in its normal, deliberative
context.10 The idea is that even if the function of reasoning is argumentative—to produce and evaluate arguments—rather than purely
epistemic, it should still lead to an improvement in epistemic status, at
both the individual and collective level. Otherwise there would be no
point in listening to other people’s arguments—and then no point in
making any argument.
Before proceeding any further, two potential sources of misunderstanding
must be dispelled. First, the claims made by the argumentative theory of reasoning are descriptive; they can be true or false, but they have no direct implications in terms of what is morally right or wrong or in terms of the norms
that ought to guide deliberators. In fact the argumentative theory of reasoning
is compatible with many normative views of politics and does not carry a normative agenda by itself. In particular, even though the argumentative theory
of reasoning claims that reasoning has evolved primarily in order to convince
others and assess their arguments, it does not mean that the theory advocates
for a policy of power struggle, partisanship, or manipulation. Despite its lack of
a normative agenda, however the argumentative theory of reasoning provides
theoretical ammunition for advocates of deliberative democracy who argue
Of course, the claims made here are only probabilistic. It is possible for an individual to
apply herself and successfully think up counter-arguments to her prior views. Similarly, it is possible for like-minded groups to do the same thing, for example by assigning someone the role
of the devil’s advocate. The theory simply posits that given what we know of the strength of the
confirmation bias and the mental discipline it requires for people to fight it, solitary reasoning
or reasoning with like-minded people is less likely to lead to good epistemic outcomes.
10
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on the basis of the epistemic properties of democratic deliberation. The argumentative theory of reasoning is thus not only compatible with an epistemic,
deliberative approach to democracy but, as this paper argues, its predictions
converge with the predictions of deliberative democrats.
Second, as mentioned above, the argumentative theory of reasoning does not
divorce reasoning entirely from truth-seeking. Truth remains on the horizon of
the argumentative theory of reasoning: reasoning also has the purpose of evaluating arguments, which forces arguers to make (mostly) sound arguments.
People may occasionally be fooled by rhetoric and well-phrased lies, but it is
ultimately easier to convince people when what you say is true and can s ustain
cool and reflective examination. Convincing others is conceptually distinct
from merely persuading them. Persuasion has to do with the p
 ackage in which
a message comes (the rhetoric of it), whereas conviction has to do with the substance of the argument. Regarding evaluation, reasoning seeks truth either in
the recognition of the force of the opponent’s argument (what H
 abermas calls
“the unforced force of the better argument”) or, less directly, through attempts
at falsifying it. There is thus no necessary disconnection between truth seeking
and the function of reasoning, although the relationship is, the theory argues,
first and foremost through the function of arguing with others.
In the same way that the empirical findings about the properties of democratic deliberation may help reformulate or reconsider various ideals of deliberative democracy, using the right theory of reasoning may help deliberative
democrats to better understand when and where deliberation is likely to work,
and thus help refine the deliberative democracy ideal.
The rest of this paper seeks to demonstrate that the argumentative theory
of reasoning is a promising candidate for such a task by outlining the theory’s
predictions for the epistemic properties of deliberation in response to two classical objections to deliberative democracy—in particular, the claim that democratic deliberation does not do much to change people’s minds, or that (when
it changes them), it changes them for the worse. In the next section, we first
consider the case on which Goodin and Niemeyer build their recommendation against external deliberation and for “deliberation within.”
DE L I B E R AT I ON W I T H I N V E R SU S DE L I B E R AT I ON W I T H OT H E R S

The argumentative theory of reasoning predicts that it is usually deliberation with others, rather than solitary reasoning, which will have the desired
transformative and epistemic properties. Specifically, the theory predicts that
external-collective processes, rather than internal-reflective processes, should
be at least as central to the process of democratic deliberation as deliberative

ARGUMENTATIVE THEORY OF REASONING AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

 emocrats commonly suppose. Some democratic theorists, however, have
d
advanced the opposite thesis.
Goodin and Niemeyer (2003; see also Goodin, 2008) thus bemoan the fact
that since the deliberative turn in the 1990s, most theorists have moved away
from the monological ideal of deliberation at the heart of Rawls’ early model of
the original position, instead embracing Habermas’ later emphasis on actual,
interpersonal engagements. For Goodin and Niemeyer, this move away from
hypothetical imagined discourse toward actual deliberation is misguided
because, for them, it is “deliberation within” rather than talking with others—
or “external deliberation”—that should be the focus of theories of deliberative
democracy. 11
Goodin first coined the expression “deliberation within” as a way to capture the pondering of reasons that goes on in an individual’s mind prior to and
during his engagement in deliberation with others. This pondering of reasons
involves an exercise in reflection and imagination, in which one is supposed
to put oneself in other people’s shoes and imagine what their arguments might
be. In that sense, deliberation within is not unlike the hypothetical, monological type of ratiocination defended by Rawls. By contrast, Goodin labels
“external deliberation” the type of discursive exchanges whereby a group collectively ponders the reasons defended by different individuals.12
One of the motivations for this embrace of deliberation within over
deliberation with others is, importantly, the unfeasibility of group deliberation on the mass scale of existing democracies and, conversely, the obvious
feasibility, at any scale, of deliberation within. If it can be shown that—even
in the “minipublics”13 studied by Goodin and Niemeyer—what does most
of the work is actually a form of internal ratiocination rather than discursive
While the original article by Goodin and Niemeyer is from 2003, all the citations in this
section will be to its latest version as a chapter in Goodin (2008).
12 The choice of “external” to characterize the deliberation that goes on in social settings is
slightly misleading in that it suggests that in deliberation with others, ideas are processed in the
ether, outside of anyone’s heads. Of course, the actual processing of arguments is always taking
place in someone’s head, not in some fictitious ‘group mind’. But the idea expressed by ‘external
deliberation’ is that when many individuals deliberate, their parallel individual reasoning takes
as an input the output of at least one other person in the group, rather than functioning in
autarky and generating all the arguments pro and con from the inside. To avoid the ambiguity,
this paper uses the expression “deliberation with others.”
13 A minipublic is “a deliberative forum consisting of 20-500 participants, focused on a particular issue, selected as a representative sample of the public affected by the issue, and convened for a period of time sufficient for participants to form considered opinions and judgments.
Examples of minipublics include deliberative polling, citizen juries, consensus conferences and
citizen assemblies.” See Warren (2008, p. 1).
11
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exchange, there would be reason to think that where group deliberation is
not feasible, it can easily be replaced by internal deliberation. Thus, on a large
scale (especially), the ideal of deliberation would have to be less discursive and
interpersonal, and more self-reflective and intra-personal.
The other main reason why Goodin and Niemeyer think we should return
our focus to hypothetical/monological rather than actual/dialogical deliberation is that as far as changing people’s minds, deliberation within is also where
the action is. Asking “When does deliberation begin?”, they answer that not
only does deliberation begin in the head of individuals prior to their engagement in social and interactive deliberation, but that much of the work of deliberation ends there. Whatever is later externalized or talked out does not do as
much as what happened earlier in the privacy of people’s minds. For Goodin
and Niemeyer, there seems to be both a chronological and epistemic priority
of deliberation within over deliberation with others. In fact, they argue that
the point of external deliberation is largely democratic legitimation, beyond
which it does not do much, epistemically speaking (Goodin, 2008, pp. 39-40).
According to them, “much (maybe most) of the work of deliberation occurs
well before the formal proceedings [of public deliberative processes]—before
the organized “talking together”—ever begin” (p. 40).
Goodin and Niemeyer’s claim relies on the case study of a specific “minipublic,” an Australian citizen’s jury convened in January 2000 to discuss policy
options for a controversial road, called the Bloomfield Track, running through
an Australian rainforest. The issue was, roughly, to decide how to reconcile the
problem of community access and environmental concerns for the unique combination of rainforest and coastal reef endangered by the track. Without going
too much into the specifics of the citizen’s jury organization, what the analysis
brings into relief is how most of the attitudinal changes in jury members took
place prior to actual formal deliberation with other jury members. During this
“information” phase, jurors visited the rain forest and the Bloomfield track,
and were given background briefings and presentations by an assembly of witnesses. Though the phase allowed for verbal exchanges between jurors, on site,
and over tea and lunch at different points, none of them were as organized as
the official deliberation phase. As Goodin and Niemeyer explicitly define deliberation in the narrower sense of “collectively organized conversations among a
group of coequals aiming at reacting (or moving towards) some joint view on
some issues of common concern,” casual interpersonal exchanges during the
information phase do not qualify as external deliberation (p. 48, our emphasis).
Substantively speaking, what happened during the information phase is
that jurors initially concerned about the impact of the Bloomfield Track on
the nearby coral reefs were no longer so worried halfway through it. Similarly,
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jurors who initially worried about the importance of the track for tourism
and as an access road for people living in remote northern towns were largely
reassured. By contrast, during the discussion phase, a similarly large change
occurred in attitudes toward only one proposition: “I will be made worse off
by any decision about the Bloomfield Track.” While the jurors worried that this
might be true throughout the information phase, their fear started to dissipate
over the course of the formal deliberation.
According to Goodin and Niemeyer’s reading of the experiment, the information phase was much more important than the deliberation phase in transforming jurors’ policy preferences:
the simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the
issues, and listening to what experts had to say did all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes.
Talking among themselves, as a jury, did virtually none of it (pp. 58-59).

This would seem to establish the crucial importance of deliberation within
and the lesser importance of external deliberation.
Such a finding, they argue, has potentially important implications for
deliberative democracy. To the extent that it is possible to extrapolate from the
micro-deliberation of a jury to the macro-deliberations of mass democracy,
there are lessons to be drawn from the first to improve the practice of the second. Goodin and Niemeyer thus invite us to speculate that much of the change
of opinions that occurs in mass democracy could be due not so much to any
formal, organized group discussion—presumably those in national assemblies
between representatives as well as those taking place in town-hall meetings or
during such events as AmericaSpeaks or Deliberation Day—but to the internal
reflection individually conducted ahead of those, “within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized
group discussion” (p. 59). This is a rather good thing, in their view, if actual,
mass scale group deliberation is unfeasible.
Goodin and Niemeyer’s argument runs directly counter to the predictions
of other deliberative democrats and the proponents of the argumentative theory of reasoning, that deliberation is more likely to have positive epistemic
properties in the dialogical context of group reasoning than in the monological context of individual reasoning. Their argument, however, relies on a relatively weak empirical case.
First, even if one case study were enough to support the case for deliberation within against external deliberation, it would not be clear that the example
shows as much as Goodin and Niemeyer say it does. To start, the informational phase is far from pure and in fact contains many deliberative features
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that could be credited for the change of jurors’ minds, rather than any internal
deliberation. Indeed, Goodin and Niemeyer themselves grant that much of the
work of the first (informative) phase was done discursively.14 Insisting, then,
on keeping the information and deliberation phases separate and attributing
all the merit of opinion change to the first phase, seems artificial. To be sure,
the “formal official task of the citizens’ jury” was in one case gathering information and, in the other, deliberating (p. 48). But the fact that much of the reasoning that prompted the jurors’ changes of minds occurred in the first phase
cannot be attributed to internal deliberation alone, to the extent that informal
and formal exchanges between jurors at that point contained arguments for
or against keeping the track. Since none of the content of the exchanges during that first information phase is documented—only the content of opinions
at different points in the experiment is measured—it is very difficult to judge
whether this information phase should not instead be recast as informal deliberation.15
Related to this, a second problem arises with the construction of the
experiment itself: the fact that jurors themselves perceived that their preferences had changed more during the information phase16 may be an artifact of
“Witnesses talked, they were interrogated, and so on. There was also much talking among
jurors themselves, both informally (over lunch or tea) and formally (in deciding what questions
to ask of witnesses)” (p. 47).
15 To be fair, Goodin and Niemeyer take that objection into account when they remark that
the fact that some discussion took place in the first phase of the jury discussion might make it
“a model of deliberation in the public sphere of ‘civil society.’” In other words, they admit that
the experiment did not so much juxtapose an information and a deliberation phase, as an informal with a formal deliberative phase. We think this is a rather powerful objection. Goodin and
Niemeyer, however, simply counter it by claiming that the Bloomfield track had long been a contentious issue within the public sphere of which jurors were already part prior to engaging in that
particular jury, so that “something in that initial phase of the jury must have made a difference
to them, that informal discussions in the public sphere had previously not.” A critique may well
grant the point and yet deny that that “something” had anything to do with deliberation within
and all to do with a higher motivation to listen to what is said in the minipublic sphere of the
jury than to what was ever said in the larger public sphere. The higher motivation itself could
be explained by, say, a heightened sense of efficacy in the smaller rather than the larger public
sphere. The same analysis about the role of motivation as a stimulant to reasoning could be
applied to a recent paper by Muhlberger and Weber (2006), which seems to support Goodin and
Niemeyer’s conclusion in establishing the superiority of information over deliberation. In both
reported experiments, all participants are anticipating the prospect of group deliberation, even
if they have not yet taken part in group deliberation or will not formally do so. In both cases, it
could very well be this motivating factor that does the work, rather than deliberation within.
16 Three quarters of the jurors thought discussion was the least important factor in explaining
their change of mind (Goodin, 2008, p. 51).
14
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the way the experiment was presented to them. Even if informal deliberation
took place during the first phase, jurors were encouraged by the questionnaire
to conceptualize the first phase not as discussion but instead as information,
which might plausibly affect their perception of what occurred during each
phase.
These limitations, partially acknowledged by Goodin and Niemeyer themselves, cast some doubt upon the general validity of their conclusion. As a
result, it can be argued that Goodin and Niemeyer’s results do not make a
strong case for deliberation within as preferable to deliberation with others,
at least where deliberation with others is feasible. Thus, in spite of the case
they present, the argumentative theory of reasoning remains unharmed, along
with its prediction of the epistemic superiority of deliberation with others over
deliberation within.
The claim put forward by the argumentative theory of reasoning that
the normal condition of reasoning is deliberation with others rather than
deliberation within does not mean that people can never properly reason by
themselves. In fact, recent results show that it is both possible and sometimes
desirable to stimulate deliberation within where there is an anticipation that an
individual might at least have to participate in group deliberation and defend
their arguments to others (Muhlberger and Weber, 2006; see also the literature on accountability reviewed (for instance) in Lerner and Tetlock, 1999).
Conversely, it is likely that after experiencing deliberation with others in a
minipublic on one subject, individuals are then more capable of replicating the
process of reasoning from different perspectives. It is perhaps even possible to
prime individuals to reason alone in an argumentative sense, despite a natural
tendency for them not to do so.
Nonetheless, the argumentative theory of reasoning does suggest a certain
priority, if not superiority, of deliberation with others over internal deliberation: while human beings do not need an actual collective deliberation to be
able to reason properly, the fact that the normal conditions of reasoning are
those where one naturally encounters a variety of points of view makes it more
likely that reasoning—in particular the part of it that has to do with the evaluation of arguments—will occur when individuals talk things out with others
than when they try to think it through by themselves.
Talking things out with others, however, is not foolproof, and group
deliberation will not always have the hoped-for epistemic properties. Let us
now see how the argumentative theory of reasoning fares when confronted
with another classical objection raised against democratic deliberation: the
so-called “law of group polarization.” The next section explains what the challenge is and how the theory is equipped to answer it.
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T H E OB J E C T I ON F ROM T H E “L AW OF G RO U P P OL A R I Z AT I ON ”

In different books and in an influential article, Cass Sunstein (2002) has
argued that a major problem for democratic deliberation and, more generally,
deliberative democracy, is what he calls “the law of group polarization” or the
tendency for a group already sharing some views to become more extreme in
these views following joint discussion. Of course, among polarizing groups,
there might be some that actually converge on the truth, so polarization need
not always indicate that deliberation makes things worse. However, if polarization is a law that applies no matter what the original consensus, it is highly
doubtful that in most cases the polarization effect is connected to any epistemic improvement. In fact, even occasional convergence toward the truth
might be achieved accidentally, and thus would fail to provide an argument
for deliberation. As Sunstein suggests, if group polarization is such a routine
phenomenon, it would seem to provide a strong argument for turning away
from democratic deliberation, even where it is feasible, toward either a mere
aggregation of individual judgments, toward individual deliberation within,
or a combination of both. Furthermore, this alleged law apparently contradicts
our prediction that reasoning with others is good at improving the epistemic
status of individuals and indirectly that of the group as well.
According to Sunstein, the law of group polarization accounts for why,
after discussion, a group of moderately pro-feminist women will become more
strongly pro-feminist; why citizens of France become more critical of the
United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid; or why whites
predisposed to show racial prejudices offer more negative responses to the
question of whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.17
In order to explain group polarization in such cases, Sunstein turns to two
well-established (theoretically and empirically) mechanisms underlying group
polarization. The first involves social influences—that is, the fact that people
wish to be perceived favorably by other members of the group. Such tendencies create a pressure to conform to the perceived dominant norm. The result is
to press the group’s position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce
shifts in individual members—particularly if they hold minority views.
The other mechanism is the limited pool of persuasive arguments to which
members of the group are exposed, and the path-dependence that this creates
toward more extreme versions of foregone conclusions. To the extent that individuals’ positions are partly a function of which arguments they are exposed
17

All examples are from Sunstein (2002, p. 178).

ARGUMENTATIVE THEORY OF REASONING AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

to, and to the extent that a group already prejudiced in one direction will produce a much greater amount of argument for one side than for the other, group
discussion is likely to reinforce individuals’ prior beliefs. In Sunstein’s words,
“the key is the existence of a limited argument pool, one that is skewed (speaking purely descriptively) in a particular direction” (p. 159).
Among the general conclusions that Sunstein derives from “the law of
group polarization” is that deliberation is overrated. In his view, the underlying mechanisms of group deliberation “do not provide much reason for confidence” (p. 187). He even suggests that since we do not have any reason to
think that deliberation is “making things better rather than worse,” and given
the mechanisms prevailing behind the law of group polarization, “the results of
deliberative judgments may be far worse than the results of simply taking the
median of pre-deliberation judgments” (p. 187). In other words, and in contrast
to Goodin and Niemeyer, Sunstein believes that deliberation not only changes
people minds, but changes them for the worse. Are Sunstein’s warnings about
the risk of group polarization a reason to give up on deliberation with others and
instead embrace deliberation within or an aggregation of those views? In other
words, should we give up on the ideal of deliberative democracy? We think not.
First, the problem of group polarization does not constitute a reason to
embrace deliberation within over external deliberation because, even if the
pressure to conform had no effect on the lone reasoner (which nothing guarantees), the limited pool of arguments present within her own head certainly
would. Second, such a case against deliberation with others suffers from the
fact that this law of polarization applies only to a type of communication that
fails the standard of deliberation as the proponents of the argumentative theory of reasoning and most deliberative democrats define it.
Recall that according to our definition, deliberation must involve a genuine consideration of arguments for and against something. An interpersonal
exchange in which arguments for both sides are not properly considered does
not count as “deliberative.” From that point of view, many of the discursive
exchanges among like-minded people described by Sunstein—be they groups
of feminists, Anti-American French, or racist Americans—are likely to fall
short of the requirements of deliberation. The fact that such exchanges lead to
polarization is therefore not an indictment of deliberation properly construed,
but of something else which at best deserves the name “discussion.”18 The key
Manin (2005) makes a similar point. He further insists that, contrary to what many authors
besides Sunstein emphasize (e. g., Bohman, 2007), diversity of views is not enough since even
people with different perspectives may fail to engage each other’s arguments in the kind of
adversarial manner conducive to epistemically satisfying deliberation.
18
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is not just to have diverse arguments, but arguments that respond to each other
in critical, even conflicting ways.
Sunstein (2002, p. 177) calls exchanges among like-minded people “enclave
deliberation” (presumably after Mansbridge, 1994). Yet, even among likeminded people, there is a difference between an argumentative exchange—
that is, an exchange that genuinely pits arguments against each other—and an
exchange of diverse but self-reinforcing views. It is not just the starting point
of the deliberation that matters; deliberative exchanges must be based on arguments that oppose each other. As with individuals, not all like-minded groups
are bound to polarize. The advantage of a group over an individual, however,
is that the greater the number of people in the group, the less likely they are
to be all perfectly like-minded, hence increasing the chances that a conflicting
perspective can trigger genuine deliberation.19
If we consider only the cases of real deliberation (where arguments for and
against something are debated), the results are much more positive. Such deliberation does tend to produce good reasoning, which in turn produces good
outcomes, in terms of improving beliefs and related decisions (see Mercier
and Landemore, 2012). For instance, when people have different and conflicting opinions on issues about which there exists a factual answer, deliberation
improves performances, sometimes dramatically (see e. g. Sniezek and Henry,
1989). This also applies when there is no strictly superior answer but one can
distinguish between better and worse arguments offered in support of a given
alternative (Laughlin, Bonner and Miner, 2002). The good performance of
reasoning in the context of genuine deliberation is also supported by many
studies on teamwork in the workplace and at school (e. g. Michaelsen, Watson
and Black, 1989; Slavin, 1996), as well as in studies of deliberating citizens in
various contexts (e. g. Fishkin, 2009; Warren and Pearse, 2008). The consensus
Sunstein briefly raises the possibility that the kind of group exchanges among like-minded
people that he considers—“enclave deliberation”—does not qualify as proper deliberation.
To this objection, his terse reply is that, “[i]f deliberation requires a measure of disagreement,
this is a serious question” (2002, p. 186). He nonetheless goes on to argue that “even like-minded
people will have different perspectives and views, so that a group of people who tend to like affirmative action, or to fear global warming, will produce some kind of exchange of opinion. I will
urge that in spite of this point, enclave deliberation raises serious difficulties for the participants
and possibly for society as a whole” (p. 186, our emphasis). We take it that in fact, at this point
in the paper, and regardless of whatever problems arise from group polarization for individuals
and society, Sunstein has conceded the main issue: Discussion among like-minded people who
fail to consider arguments pro and con is not deliberation per se and the law of polarization,
which turns out to apply only to groups of like-minded people who do not properly deliberate,
can no longer be used as an argument against democratic deliberation.
19
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is that the deliberating groups of citizens in these cases ended up with betterinformed beliefs and, where relevant, more compelling policy proposals.20
When we shift the focus from the starting point of deliberation or discussion (whether or not there is a like-minded group) to its content (whether or
not there is a real exchange of arguments), we can see that not all groups of
like-minded people are doomed to polarize. Therefore, against what Sunstein
suggests, the threat of polarization might not be well-addressed by diversifying
the pool of opinions to include “full information”—knowledge of all the relevant facts, values, options, and arguments that might affect a decision (2002,
pp. 191-192). Such a requirement, as Sunstein points out, would indeed be
daunting, should we have to meet it in order to realize the epistemic benefits
of deliberation. While more information is undoubtedly better than less, it is
just as important (and perhaps more important) to ensure that people treat
this information correctly, that is, seek and build opposing arguments on the
basis of the available information. Depolarization can then occur even if the
pool of arguments and information is far from exhaustive.21 And even if we
have access to full information, there is still value to be had in talking things
out with others.
The argumentative theory of reasoning thus predicts that, more important
than the initial distribution of information, is the role of participants’ confirmation biases. Even full information cannot guarantee depolarization if everybody’s confirmation bias points in the same direction to begin with. Many
different confirmation biases can be put to good use, however. When group
members disagree, each of them is still more likely to find arguments for her
own side of the issue, but the combined effects of their respective biases guarantees a more exhaustive individual exposure to arguments for and against
a given issue. As a bonus, there is no need for full information prior to the
debate: full (or at least, more complete) information is precisely one of the
main achievements of the debate. Far from being a nuisance, the confirmation
bias ensures a division of cognitive labor within the group.
In our view, Sunstein’s argument blows out of proportion an epistemic failure that affects only groups of strictly like-minded people that do not engage
Gerry Mackie (2006) provides an important methodological caveat for these studies.
He notes that the effects of deliberation are “typically latent, indirect, delayed, or disguised,” and
that therefore some studies may fail to observe them even though they are real. This argument
therefore strengthens any positive results actually obtained.
21 Of course, if information—the argument pool—is too limited and too biased, deliberation
based on it will not achieve miracles. But between the extremes of seriously limited and biased
information on the one hand and full information on the other, there is a space in which deliberation can have transformative and epistemic properties, even among initially like-minded people.
20
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in genuine deliberation per se; his argument also fails to see that there is something more fundamentally problematic than social homogeneity. Thus, the real
question is: Why do like-minded people fail to consider other arguments, and
how can we institutionalize collective decision-making so as to remedy this
phenomenon? The theory of reasoning as arguing predicts that only discursive
exchanges among like-minded people that do not involve a proper weighing
of the pros and cons will lead to polarization, but not necessarily discussion
among people who start with the same information and argument pool but
engage in proper deliberation, even on a skewed informational basis.
C ONC LU SI ON

The argumentative theory of reasoning used in this article yields predictions
regarding the transformative properties of deliberation that should give pause
to advocates of deliberation within or sheer judgment aggregation, and give
heart to advocates of external deliberation. The theory allows us to predict
where deliberation is likely to work well—in contexts that fulfill or approximate
the normal circumstances for which reasoning was designed, i. e., argumentative, social contexts—and when it is likely not to—in abnormal contexts, i. e.,
solitary reasoning or non-deliberative discussion among like-minded people.
Most importantly for deliberative democrats, if this theory of reasoning
is correct, it lends plausibility to the claim implicit in the normative ideal of
deliberative democracy, that deliberation with others has more epistemic virtues than reasoning on one’s own.
Finally, the argumentative theory of reasoning also suggests that there
is nothing utopian about the demands placed by deliberative democrats on
individual reasoning. In its normal, dialogical context, reasoning performs its
function well; in this context, confirmation biases are actually harnessed to
epistemic benefits. There is no need to deplore or try to fix the limitations of
individual reasoning. What matters is to set up the optimal conditions for it:
genuine deliberation with others.
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